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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
While jurisdiction over this appeal originates in the Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78A-3-203(2)(i) (1953 as amended), in that it 
involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony, the case was directly filed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether or not the trial court was correct when it denied Defendant's Pre-
Trial Motion to Suppress Evidence determining that Utah law sufficiently provides 
for an emergency aid doctrine I exception to the warrant requirements, and that 
under the facts of this case, the exception applied. 
1 As set forth in Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ,I12-13, 994 P.2d 
3 
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ST AND ARD OF REVIEW FOR THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
The standard of review is one of "review for correctness" because this is a 
criminal case and poses a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Richards, 
2009 UT App 397, ,r 7,224 P.3d 733; State v. Morris, 2009 UT App 181, ,r 5,214 
p.3d 883 (providing that a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress 
evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact: appellate court reviews factual 
findings for clear error and its legal conclusion, including its application of the 
legal standard to the facts, non-deferentially for correctness); State v. Wilkinson, 
2008 UT App 395, ,r 5, 197 P.3d 96 (providing that challenges to suppression 
rulings present questions of law reviewed for correctness without deference to the 
trial court's application of law to facts); State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ,r 8, 182 
P.3d 935; State v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, ,r 3, 182 P.3d 585 (providing that 
appellate courts give no deference to trial court's application of law to the facts); 
State v. Weaver, 2007 UT App 292, ,r 8, 169 P.3d 760 (stating that suppression 
issue presents mixed question of law and fact); State v. Adams, 2007 UT App 117 ,r 
7, 158 P.3d 1134 (stating that appellate courts review a ruling on a motion to 
suppress for correctness, without deference to the district court's application of the 
law to the facts). 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CITATION TO RECORD PRESERVING ISSUE IN TRIAL COURT 
Mr. Anderson first addressed the issue of the suppression of evidence when 
his counsel filed the Motion to Suppress Evidence. Record at Page 57-60. The 
Motion was thereafter amended. Record at Page 70-75. Ultimately the Court ruled 
on the motion denying it by Memorandum Decision. Record at Page 312-318. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS SEEKING REVIEW OF 
AN ISSUE NOT PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The issue that is the focus of this appeal was preserved in the trial court 
record. Appellant does not seek review of an issue not preserved in the trial court 
record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV .............................. 15 
Utah Code Ann., §58-37-8(1)(a)(i) ...................................... 5 
Utah Code Ann., §58-37-(8)(a)(iii) ...................................... 6 
Utah Code Annotated, §78A-3-203(2)(i) (1953 as amended) .................. 6 
Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)U) (1953 as amended) .................. 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 8, 2015 in the Sixth Judicial District Court in Kane 
County, Utah, Defendant/Appellant was convicted by his admission contained in 
the Conditional Plea Agreement and Statement of Defendant. Record at page 335-
340. His conviction by conditional plea was to the offenses of Count 1 of the 
Information: PRODUCTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE in a Drug 
Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann., §58-37-
5 
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8(l)(a)(i); and Count 2 of the Information: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE in a Drug Free Zone, a 
Second Degree Felony in violation of Utah Code Ann., §58-37-8(l)(a)(iii). Record 
at page 335-340. Judgment and sentence were entered July 2, 2015. Record at 
page 344-346. Notice of Appeal was timely filed on July 9, 2015. Record at page 
352-353. This appeal follows. 
This appeal is from the finding of "guilty" pursuant to the Conditional Plea 
Agreement and Statement of Defendant. Record at page 335-340. The focus of 
the appeal is whether the court properly denied a motion to suppress evidence. 
This is an appeal from the final judgment in the Sixth District Court of Kane 
County, State of Utah, sentencing the Defendant to: Count 1 ( of the Information) a 
term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison, with a fine including statutory 
surcharge and court security fee in the amount of $19,033.00; and Count 2 ( of the 
Information) a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison with a fine including the 
statutory surcharge and the court security fee in the amount of $19,033.00. The 
Court suspended the prison sentence and all but $750.00 of the fine, and placed the 
Defendant on probation for 36 months subject to terms and conditions. Record at 
page 344-351. 
While jurisdiction over this appeal originates in the Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78A-3-203(2)(i) (1953 as amended), in that it 
6 
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involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony the case was directly filed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)U) (1953 as amended). 
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on July 9, 2015. Record at page 352-
353. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACT~ 
At the Preliminary Hearing the investigating officer testified that at the time 
of the event, Mr. Adams, the Defendant, was living alone in the residence. Prelim 
Transcript3 at page 16 lines 13-16. 
Mr. Adams' mother notified law enforcement that she had not heard from 
the Defendant for four days. Prelim at page 24 lines 19-21. She requested a 
welfare check on her son. The officer was contacted by dispatch to perform the 
welfare check at approximately the evening. 
On March 2, 2013, Defendant's mother, Lynn Clark, called Kane County 
Dispatch and requested that an officer check on her son at his home in Big Water, 
Utah. Ms. Clark reported that shad had not heard form her son in three days, that 
he has ongoing health issues and that she was very worried. In response, Kane 
2 The facts are recited largely from the Memorandum Decision issued by the trial 
court. In so doing the Appellant takes no issue with the recited facts. Since those 
facts support the trial court's decision they are appropriately stated. Davidson, 
(Citation omitted.) 
3 References to the transcript of the preliminary hearing will hereafter be stated as 
"Prelim." 
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County Dispatch contacted Marshall Russell Johnson of the Big Water Marshall's 
Office and informed him of the request for a welfare check. Because Marshall 
Johnson was leaving town at the time, he asked Dispatch to contact Deputy Rob 
Johnson of the Kane County Sheriff's Office and ask him to perform the welfare 
check 
Deputy Johnson proceeded to Defendant's home to perform the welfare 
check. He knocked on the front door but no one answered. He found evidence 
around the home suggesting someone had recently been repairing leaky pipes 
under the home and working on the top of the house. There was an extension cord 
that powered a light running from an open window to a crawl space under the 
home. There were tools on top of the roof near an air conditioning unit and the 
area near the crawl space was moist. There were no vehicles present on the 
property. Prelim at pages 38-45. 
Deputy Johnson yelled into the home but no one answered. Defendant's 
neighbors told the Deputy that they had not seen the Defendant for two or three 
days.4 
Deputy Johnson observed there was a light on in the living room but could 
not see anything in the home from outside. Deputy Johnson called Defendant's 
mother to discuss the situation with her. Defendant's mother relayed her previous 
4 This is a period of time less than the officer stated at the preliminary hearing. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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concerns about her son to Deputy Johnson and asked him to "use whatever means 
necessary" to enter the home to ascertain that her son was okay. 
Deputy Johnson entered the home using the open living room window. 
Upon entering, Deputy Johnson immediately saw what he described as several 
marijuana plants and a plant light. He looked around the home in places where the 
Defendant might have been, but could not locate him and left. 
Approximately a week later, the Defendant was seen in his front yard. On 
March 12, 2013, the Marshall filed an affidavit and obtained a search warrant to 
search the home for marijuana plants. On March 12, 2013 the Marshall in 
company with the investigating Deputy and others executed the warrant. 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant had apparently not phoned his mother for four days. She became 
concerned for his welfare and notified law enforcement of her concern. The 
officers attempted to make a welfare check but got no response when they knocked 
on the door of his residence. They could not see the Defendant inside when they 
looked through a window. Neighbors reported that they had not seen the 
Defendant in two or three days. At the further urging of the Appellant's mother, 
officers entered the home without a warrant through an unlocked window. 
Once inside, the officers observed what they considered to be growing 
5 This rendition of facts is largely quoted from the Memorandum Decision, Record 
at page 312-318. 
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marijuana plants. After observing the plants, and failing to find the Defendant 
inside the residence, they left. Ten days later they secured and served a warrant to 
search the residence. 
A Motion to Suppress the evidence was submitted to the Court on the basis 
that the warrantless search was not excused by the known exceptions to the warrant 
requirements under 4th Amendment jurisprudence. The Court, however, ruled that 
the facts of this case did qualify as an 'emergency aid doctrine' exception to the 
warrant requirements and denied the motion. The court was mistaken. 
ARGUMENT 
When police enter a private residence, they must do so with a warrant unless 
the entry is supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). The burden to establish both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances is heavy particularly because of the heightened 
expectation of privacy enjoyed by citizens in their own homes. State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). In lieu of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, our courts have recognized the emergency aid doctrine as an 
exception to the warrant requirements. But to protect the privacy expectation in 
one's home, the exceptions are strictly limited in application or availability. The 
elements of the emergency aid doctrine exception are clear. 
In Davidson, the Utah Supreme Court established the three prong test for the 
IO 
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authorization of the emergency aid doctrine. Pursuant to that test, a warrantless 
search is lawful under the emergency aid doctrine only if the following 
requirements are met: 
( 1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their 
assistance for the protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize 
evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area 
or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area 
to be searched and the emergency. Davidson, at 112. 
The court discusses the distinctions between probable cause and the 
substituted 'reasonable basis' stated in the third prong of the emergency aid 
doctrine test. "In general, '[p ]robable cause means a "fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." (Citations omitted). The third 
prong of the emergency aid doctrine, on the other hand, "asks whether there was 
some reasonable basis to associate the place searched with the emergency. 
(Citations omitted.) Thus, the search "of one individual is undertaken for the 
purpose of facilitating efforts to tend to the possible health needs of others." 
( Citation omitted.) The difference between exigent circumstances and emergency 
aid situations is that in the former there is probable cause but no warrant, while in 
the latter there is no probable cause to justify a warrant and the purpose is not to 
11 
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arrest, search, or gather evidence. (Citation Omitted.) Because this reasonable 
basis must approximate probable cause and is used to justify abrogation of 
Fourth Amendment rights, emergency aid searches should be '"strictly 
circumscribed by [circumstances] which justify its initiation."' (Emphasis 
added.) ( Citations omitted.) 
One may reasonably conclude that unless the evidence establishes the 
elements required for the applicability of an exception, evidence obtained without 
following the requirements must be suppressed. State v. Humphrey, 138 P. 3d 590, 
594 (Utah App. 2006). 
The burden of proof at the suppression hearing stage of the proceedings is 
generally preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, 10. In 
this case, although the legal burden of proof is the lowest legal standard, the trial 
court erred in applying that standard. The weight of the evidence in the record 
clearly preponderates against the State's evidence. 
This case turns on the question of whether an exception to the warrant 
requirements can be applied if the police did have 1) an objectively reasonable 
basis to believe that an emergency exists, and a belief that there is an immediate 
need6 for their assistance for the protection of life. 7 2) Their search must not be 
6 This prong of the exception is arguably the equivalent of exigent circumstance. 
7 This prong of the exception raises the level of exigent circumstance to exclusively 
the protection of life as opposed to the dissipation of evidence of a crime. This is 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. 3) There must be some 
reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. 
That is, there must be a connection with the area to be searched and the emergency. 
Davidson, at ,I12-13. 
The mother's concern that her adult son had not contacted her in four days 
did not raise to the level of an emergency as contemplated by law. Although she 
reported her son's ongoing health issues, the record does not support her 
statements with evidence explaining the basis for her opinion and report regarding 
those issues. The neighbors had not seen the Defendant for two or three days, but 
none had called law enforcement for a welfare check. There was recent activity 
around the home including moist dirt, an extension cord, activity on the roof of the 
home and a light on inside the home. There was no reported sign of injury such as 
blood etc. No vehicles were present on the property. Objectively observing, no 
one was home. 
The officer did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency existed or that there was an immediate need for assistance for the 
protection of life. Prelim at pages 38-45. The record of the officer's testimony 
also does not disclose any particular health issue that might have afflicted the 
Defendant justifying a conclusion that his life was or could have been in danger. 
so because the exception is permitting the intrusion into the home of our citizenry. 
13 
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There was no objective information that suggests that there was an immediate need 
for assistance to protect life. 
The officers did not have a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with 
the area or place they searched. They did not observe the Defendant lying on the 
floor inside, nor was there any indication that there was distress or foul play. 
There was no indication that there was trouble within the residence. There was 
silence when the officer knocked - no response from inside. Because there were 
no sounds inside and evidence of emergency of foul play and no vehicles present 
on the property, the reasonable conclusion is that no one was home. There is 
insufficient evidence to conclude otherwise when considering the totality of the 
circumstances. 
It is conceded by Appellant that the officers' motivation in entering the 
home was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. They 
were surprised to observe the plants and equipment within the home. There is 
~ nothing in the record of any concern or suspicion of illegal activity at the 
residence. They were urged to enter the home by the mother of the Appellant. It 
was her concern that they were addressing, not their own and not those of 
Appellant's immediate neighbors. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects '[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unreasonable searches and seizures."' State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, 263. 
Utah likewise recognizes the importance of the 4th Amendment protections. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has stated: "The touchstone of our analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal 
security."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 ( 1968)). 
When officers entered the Appellant's home, they did so outside the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and outside the established emergency aid 
doctrine exception. Their entry, without a warrant, violated his privilege to be 
secure in his home. 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
The testimony of Officer Rob Johnson at the evidentiary hearing for the 
Motions to Suppress and to Quash held January 9, 2014 establishes that the 
officers who responded to the welfare check had no authorization to enter the 
home. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing page 11. The following exchange 
occurred starting at line 7: 
Q. . .. With respect to the welfare check, nobody who lived in the home 
gave you permission to enter the home, did they? 
A. No. 
15 
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Q. You crawled through a window, didn't you, to get into the home at that 
point? 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't have a warrant, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Nobody let you inside the home, did they? 
A. No. 
Q. Nobody opened the door for you to come into the home, did they? 
A. No. 
Q. There was nobody home, was there? 
A. No. 
Q. You looked through the windows prior to entering the home, didn't 
A. Tried. They were pretty well covered. You couldn't see much. 
Q. So you really didn't see anything? 
A. You could see, yeah, just the light was on in the front room that I ended 
up crawling through, and really couldn't see anything through it. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Comment: Then the officer testifies that he saw no over-turned furniture or 
16 
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anything like that; no broken glass; no signs of a break in; no signs that a fight had 
taken place. Then continuing: 
Q. You really didn't see anything that concerned you at that point, did you? 
A. Well, yes and no, nothing that I found to be exclusively by itself 
concerning, but like I mentioned before, there was a light on underneath the home, 
like an extension cord and a light ran underneath the crawl space. There was some 
tools there. It looked like somebody had bee working on maybe a leaky pipe or 
something. Then there was a ladder laying against the house, and I did crawl up 
that ladder and look on top to make sure Mr. Adams wasn't on the roof working on 
something. There was some tools laying around the AC unit, but they had rust on 
them, didn't look like anybody had used those tools for quite some time .... So no, 
in and of itself, there was nothing there that I found specifically concerning, no. 
Comment: The officer then testifies that he did not smell anything outside 
the home that concerned him; did not see any signs of forced entry; there were no 
sounds of distress or any sounds coming from the house. The officer then explains 
that there were no vehicles at the residence including a motorcycle that the officer 
believed the Appellant owned. 8 Continuing at page 15 line 3: 
Q. Didn't all the physical evidence you observed prior to entering Mr. 
Adam's home indicate that nobody was home? 
8 See Prelim at pages 38-45. 
17 
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A. Yeah. I had no indication that said that he was there. 
Q. No one answered the door, did they? 
A. No. 
Q. There was no blood or other indication of any injury? 
A. No. Well, the indication was just that his mother and the Big Water 
Marshal had both stated that he was in poor health, and the mother was used to 
hearing from him frequently every day or every other day, and hadn't heard from 
him for several days. 
In addition to the testimony evidence, marshaling also includes the recitation 
of the facts and other content in the Memorandum Decision. 
END OF MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
ARGUMENT CONTINUED 
The testimony preserved in the hearings in this case as well as the rendition 
~ of the facts made by the court in denying the Motion to Suppress demonstrates that 
the investigating officer entered the residence without permission, without 
observing information that would lead him to be concerned about the preservation 
of life, and without a warrant. To the officer on the scene, there was no 
emergency. His actions were based on him being urged by a mistaken third party. 
Two of the elements stated in the Davidson case are not satisfied. When the 
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two elements remain unsatisfied, the exception to the warrant requirements known 
as the 'emergency aid doctrine' is not available to preclude the need to follow the 
warrant requirements. There was no reason to circumvent getting a warrant. There 
was no objective evidence of an emergency that required intrusion into the home 
without a warrant. To believe otherwise would be tantamount to believing that 
when a citizen is away on vacation or grocery shopping and away from home or 
angry with one's mother and not calling frequently enough for her, the State should 
have the exception to the warrant requirement available. The entry of the 
residence by the officer was not lawful. The evidence obtained through the 
unlawful entry, should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has stated "[a] warrantless search of a 
home is presumptively unreasonable, and evidence obtained from such a search is 
inadmissible, subject only to a few carefully established exceptions." U.S. v. 
Harrison, 639 F3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011). In the instant case, the exception 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the court below erred in denying the Motion to Suppress Evidence 
in this case, the Defendant/ Appellant has been wrongfully convicted of a crime in 
this State. His conviction by conditional plea should be reversed. 
Because the evidence from the first warrantless entry must be suppressed, it 
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cannot be used as a basis to find probable cause for the resulting search warrants. 
The convictions based on evidence obtained during the initial improper search and 
resulting warrants should be reversed. 
~ 
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